LEGISLATIVE SESSION
November 18, 2026 · Spoken on the Senate floor · 10,050 words
Mr. President, during my 14 years in Congress, I have served in every combination of power between the White House and Congress: a Democratic President with a Republican House and a Democratic Senate; a Democratic President with a Republican House and Senate; a Republican trifecta; a Republican President with a Democratic House and a Republican Senate; a Democratic trifecta; a Democratic President, Republican House, and Democratic Senate--that is every possible …
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Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to speak for up to 90 minutes.
Mr. President, during my 14 years in Congress, I have served in every combination of power between the White House and Congress: a Democratic President with a Republican House and a Democratic Senate; a Democratic President with a Republican House and Senate; a Republican trifecta; a Republican President with a Democratic House and a Republican Senate; a Democratic trifecta; a Democratic President, Republican House, and Democratic Senate--that is every possible combination--and also, now, a Republican trifecta again.
And while I won't be serving in this body come January 4, the next combination will be one that we last saw in 2007 and 2008: a Republican President with a Democratic House and a Democratic Senate.
It seems the American people demand change in Washington on a regular basis. May that reality help us to govern with humility, wisdom, and attend to the needs and concerns of the people we serve.
But today I want to focus on an urgent need for a different kind of change--change within this esteemed institution itself.
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Those were the words that my fellow Montanan, the then-Senate majority leader Mike Mansfield, used in 1971 to describe the bipartisan frustration with the growing abuse of the filibuster. Senator Mansfield knew that substantial reforms to the cloture rule were desperately needed, both to prevent a revolt from Senators and to protect the power and prestige of this institution. That was 1971. Mansfield feared the Senate could even become an innocuous House of Lords that would seek influence of the House of Representatives.
Unfortunately, the reforms that the Senate adopted during the 1970s and since have failed to safeguard this institution as a deliberative and functional body. And by any fair measure, dysfunction in the Senate has only gotten worse, and this institution has only become weaker in the decades since.
As my former colleague from the State of Utah Senator Orrin Hatch, who served 42 years as a U.S. Senator, said during his final speech in 2018 on this floor, “The Senate, as an institution, is in crisis.”
Today, many Members on both sides of the aisle share this unfortunate and unacceptable conclusion, and demand for institutional change is once again in the air.
There is bipartisan concern that the Senate is not carrying out our article I powers and responsibilities. It has been diminished. We are concerned that this body is incapable of addressing the pressing challenges our country faces, and we are concerned that a diminished Senate will ultimately threaten our country's prosperity and even our national security.
But I hope I have some good news--some better news. I rise to discuss my comprehensive, bipartisan plan with Democratic Senator Jeff Merkley of Oregon to halt the Senate's decline and restore its power and influence, all while protecting its distinguishing characteristics.
Following one term in the U.S. House, I have had the privilege of serving in the U.S. Senate now for 12 years. I immediately felt the weight of this office as soon as I took the oath: advice and consent of every Supreme Court and Cabinet nominee, a muscular role in shaping foreign policy, serving as the jury at impeachment trials, and being the ultimate decider of whether treaties are ratified or fall by the wayside. All of this is decided not by 435 legislators but, uniquely, just 100 here in the U.S. Senate, as the Founding Fathers intended.
The Framers of the Senate knew that greater responsibilities could draw political opposition and, at least for a short time, be at odds with the fickle passions of energetic citizens. So they sought to protect the Senate from reckless shifts in public opinion by establishing 6-year terms, having the Senate be a continuous body where only one-third of the Senators would be up for reelection every 2 years and, in its original design, having Senators appointed by State legislatures rather than direct elections.
The Framers also established a higher eligibility age and, in fact, longer citizenship requirements for U.S. Senators. Taken together, these characteristics of the Senate were designed intentionally to help ensure that Senators exercised a more deliberative and mature judgment, insulated to a greater degree from the shifting passions of public opinion. In the words of James Madison, the Senate is supposed to be a necessary fence against hasty and unwise decisions that the Framers knew the House would sometimes make.
And I haven't even mentioned the most profound and perhaps brilliant feature of the U.S. Senate, and that, of course, is that every State gets equal representation in the Senate. My State of Montana, which ranks 43rd in population, has as much voting power as California; Rhode Island has as much as Texas; and the list goes on.
I am not sure we sufficiently appreciate how important this feature of the Senate was in 1789 and remains today. So let me offer a few stats to drive it home. In the House, the combined delegations of just nine States make up the majority of House Members. Let me repeat that. More than half of the House seats come from nine States: California, Texas, Florida, New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Georgia, and North Carolina. Together, these 9 States control 221 House seats--more than the 218 that constitute a majority.
This occurred for the simple reason that the size of a State's delegation in the House is determined by population. And as one can expect, roughly half of our country's population resides in those nine States. The other half resides in the other 41 States. This feature of the House empowers larger populated States with substantially greater voting power compared to smaller populated States.
Now, let's compare that to the design of the U.S. Senate. Because each State gets 2 seats, it takes the combined representation of 25 States--or 26 for the party that doesn't control the Presidency--to establish a majority. Not 9 States, but at least 25.
Let me drive this home as well. The largest 25 States by population make up nearly 85 percent of our country's population. Yet they control half of the Senate seats. In the House, these same 25 States control 361 seats. In the Senate, the 25 States with the lowest populations represent 15 percent of the country's population. They could theoretically defeat a proposal supported by the largest 25 States. In practice, this remarkable characteristic of the Senate ensures that a composite of both large and smaller populated States is needed to pass legislation or confirm a nominee.
Some might view that as a bug. The Framers strongly viewed that as a feature. Only this institution, the U.S. Senate, ensures that the interest of smaller populated States, like Montana, cannot be single-handedly crushed by larger populated States.
As James Madison wrote in Federalist 58: In the House, the larger States will have the most weight; in the Senate, the advantage will be in favor of the smaller States.
In fact, Madison added, in Federalist 62, that the structure of the Senate would serve as a “complicated check” against “improper legislation.” He emphasizes that support from both “a majority of the people”--this is the House of Representatives--and the “majority of the States”--that is, the Senate--would be required to enact a bill.
In fact, Madison envisioned that the Senate served as a bulwark against bad bills, even while indicating that a numerical majority would be sufficient to pass bills both in the House and the Senate.
What I just said there is very important in terms of Madison's intent that it would be a majority, numeric majority, to pass a bill in the House and the Senate.
To summarize thus far, the two most important distinguishing characteristics of the Senate are facilitating a more deliberative and politically insulated judgment and giving equal voting power to every State regardless of population.
Over time, these bedrock features of the U.S. Senate have been expanded substantially and arguably distorted. And in that vein, nothing generates more discussion than the shifting concept of the filibuster. The term “filibuster” has historically been hard to define. But today, it is synonymous of a supermajority cloture rule requiring 60 votes to shut off debate before a vote on passage can occur. Stated more colloquially: It takes 60 votes to pass most legislation in the U.S. Senate.
But did the Framers of the Senate think of the common procedural delays of their era in the same way? And did the men who first served as Senators and wrote our first rules in 1789 give any indication that the supermajority would effectively be required to pass legislation?
What exactly was the Framers' vision for how the Senate would operate?
Well, for that answer, I didn't seek one-sided resources that perhaps prejudged conclusion based on their own political preferences. No, I learned when I was in high school debate at Bozeman High School, it is critical to examine a wide range of scholarship from historians, from political scientists, and, in fact, our former colleagues. And that is exactly what I have tried to do today and will unpack here over the course of the next hour or so.
It began just months after I took office in the U.S. Senate in January of 2015. I asked then the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service to provide an overview of the scholarship and answer these following questions: Did the Framers intend for the Senate to operate under majority rule? A fundamental question.
Did they envision the filibustering tactics that we have seen in recent decades?
Did they envision legislation or nominations needing support from a supermajority of Senators before a vote on passage or confirmation could occur?
And what actually happened in 1806 when the Senate discarded the previous question motion that was included in the original Senate rules?
To be clear, I didn't ask CRS to put a thumb on the scale or draw its own conclusions, but, instead, to provide an overview of how scholars addressed these questions. And I can tell you: CRS put a lot of thought into that memo. It took over a year to complete and involved many conversations with my staff. But in May of 2016, CRS sent me the memo, and I am sharing it publicly for the benefits of all Senators, for those who are students of this body, and the public.
To summarize at length, CRS reviewed the scholarship and observed that: One, scholars generally agree that there is little evidence that the Framers or early Senators expected the filibuster to be a defining feature of the institution.
Second, they concluded that Senate scholars rarely claim that the Framers intended for the Senate to allow extended debate. CRS references political scientist Gregory Wawro's Senate testimony in 2010, that there is “ample evidence” that the Framers envision the Senate legislating by simple majority.
CRS cites scholars Sarah Binder and Stephen Smith who point out that the Framers were concerned about supermajority requirements following the failure of the Articles of Confederation. In fact, Binder and Smith highlight Alexander Hamilton's warning against supermajority requirements in Federalist 22.
Further, CRS writes that the original rules of the Senate “imposed limits on what might be viewed as unnecessary debate,” including rule IV, which said: No member shall speak more than twice in any one debate on the same day, without leave of the Senate. Today's rule XIX is similar in concept.
Citing the research of Historian Richard Beeman, the memo notes that, in an 1801 parliamentary manual drafted by Thomas Jefferson, then President of the Senate--he put this together in 1801--he stated this:
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The nonbinding, but influential, manual also stated: The voice of the majority decides.
On the other hand, the CRS memo points out that some scholars argue that the filibuster is consistent with the Framers' intentions for the Senate, even though the Framers did not conceive of it. CRS references Senate scholar George Haynes' conclusion in 1938, that establishing a straightforward, simple majority cloture tool would violate the distinguishing characteristics of the Senate that I previously highlighted and result in hasty decisions.
The memo quotes from Senator Robert Byrd's renowned remark to new Senators in 1996, during which he highlighted the “Senate's absolute right to unlimited debate and to amend or block legislation passed by the lower house.” Byrd also reminded them that “Senators were intended to take the long view and be able to resist, if need be, the passions of the often intemperate House.”
Similarly, the memo references former Senate Parliamentarian Robert Dove and Richard Arenberg's conclusion that the supermajority rules of the Senate provide a useful test when the majority may be overzealous.
Regarding the elimination of the previous question motion of 1806, CRS notes that the motion was used rarely and for the purpose of postponing debate “on account of its delicate or sensitive nature,” not to shut off debate. CRS observes that scholars generally agreed with this point.
CRS writes that the historical evidence supports neither the claim that the original rule was meant to shut off debate at a simple majority threshold, nor the competing claim that the elimination of the motion in 1806 was a deliberate decision by the Senate to establish a right to a limited debate.
Finally, CRS points to research indicating that the Framers of the Senate were familiar with obstructionist tactics used in colonial legislatures, such as denying a quorum to block a vote and sought to balance the interest of the minority and majority when they established the Senate's core rules in the Constitution.
The CRS memo is an overview; it is a primer. On balance, there seems to be a good deal of consensus that the Framers expected the Senate to operate on a majority rule, unless otherwise prescribed in the Constitution. It did not establish or envision unlimited debate as a feature of the Senate.
At the same time, CRS found that some of our Senate colleagues and scholars of this institution believe the gradual expansion of the filibuster was a natural outgrowth of the Framers' intent for the Senate and is now nothing short of essential.
But what is acknowledged by virtually everyone, however, is that the rules and the practices of the Senate have changed substantially since this body first met in 1789.
The CRS memo was just the beginning of our exploration. Over the years, we have done an even deeper dive into the scholarship to gain a better understanding of how the Senate came to be a supermajoritarian body on most issues. What happened? And how did it happen?
This is going to take some time, but I think it is important to walk through the history and share with my colleagues and the American people just how the Senate got to where we are today. It won't be an exhaustive list of Senate actions or dissect every counterfactual, but my aim is to provide an accurate and comprehensive account of what happened, while pointing to additional resources for those who want to explore further.
As former Senate Historian Betty Koed and others have observed, the use of parliamentary tactics and procedural tricks to delay a vote on legislation dates back to the Senate in Rome. Forcing a delay on a vote can show constituents their leaders are fighting for them. It can encourage the majority to offer concessions. It can block a passage of a bill when a quorum is denied, especially at the end of a session, and it can affect attendance and impact the outcome of the vote.
In fact, we saw that latter motivation during the very first session in the U.S. Senate in 1789. Senator William Maclay of Pennsylvania wrote in his journal that Senators from Virginia and North Carolina “talked the time away” to avoid a vote on a House-passed legislation that would establish our Nation's permanent capital on the Susquehanna River near what is today Columbia, PA. These southern Senators spoke at length because another southern Senator was out sick and could not vote. They didn't want an attendance issue to determine the outcome of the vote.
Well, Maclay continues. There was a must-see hot air balloon the next day in New York City where our first Senate was meeting, and so the vote was delayed yet again.
The delays didn't last long. However, just one day later, the Senate voted on legislation to determine the permanent location of our Nation's Capital. Maclay's fellow Senator from Pennsylvania, Robert Morris, opposed the Susquehanna location and instead wanted our Nation's Capital to be Germantown near Philadelphia.
Senator Morris led a successful amendment to change the capital site to Germantown. The vote was 9 to 9 with Vice President Adams breaking the tie in the affirmative.
The House soon adopted the Germantown site, but they included an additional amendment. The session of Congress ended at the end of September before final differences could be resolved.
It is fair to say that had the Pennsylvania delegation in the Senate and the House more quickly agreed on where they wanted the capital, we would be in Philadelphia today. But, alas, here we are along the Potomac instead.
In all seriousness, I urge my colleagues to keep in mind what occurred here. The stalling tactic used by the southern Senators was driven by an attendance concern, and the vote was delayed by merely 2 days. Further and crucially, Senators had a right to amend, and the vote on related amendments and passage was at a simple majority. Yet a dilatory move was initially used, but it did not suppress what the majority of voting Senators supported. And even though it was a contentious matter and a close vote, there were no supermajority requirements anywhere in the process. These Senators did not envision anything like the current, modern-day filibuster.
Beeman, the historian, writes:
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The second phase in the slow expansion of the filibuster may surprise Members of this body. You see, scholars point out that the more frequent use of long-winded speeches for obstruction first actually occurred in the House, not the Senate.
In his classic 1940 book “Filibustering in the Senate,” Franklin Burdette writes:
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And perhaps even more surprising in our modern context, it was former House Members, especially John Randolph, who brought the practice of dilatory speeches to the U.S. Senate.
Next, Beeman points to a ruling in 1826. By then, Vice President John C. Calhoun has a key development in expanding debate in the Senate. At sharp odds with President John Quincy Adams over policy matters, Calhoun ruled, in his capacity as Presiding Officer of the Senate, that he would not impede Senators who wanted wide latitude during their speeches to drift off into matters unrelated to the topic at hand. In doing so, Calhoun reduced the influence of the executive branch over Senate affairs, and Adams was furious about Calhoun's refusal to use the Senate rules to call the Senate to order.
Two years later, the Senate did clarify that the Presiding Officer could call Senators to order, but also made clear that the full Senate would be the final arbiter of whether the initial ruling would stand. Importantly, Beeman indicates that Senators took this action to limit interference from the executive branch, not to establish the right to unlimited debate.
He writes:
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Now, this takes us to 1841. Scholars tend to agree that the first true talking filibuster occurred that year, when now-Senator Calhoun and allies used extensive speeches and an amendment vote to delay passage of legislation to recharter a national bank.
Senator Henry Clay became infuriated and threatened to put forth a measure to allow a majority of our Senators to shut off debate and move quickly to final passage.
Calhoun fiercely resisted, arguing that the minority “had the right to question, examine, and discuss those measures which they believe in their hearts are to the best interests of the country.”
Senator William King of Alabama added that if Clay pushed his controversial proposal, he should make his arrangements at his boarding house for the winter.
This episode is an example of dissenting Senators insisting on the right to speak, so long as they had something to say or an amendment to offer. But it is noteworthy that those seeking to delay a vote had to hold the floor. They had to work. They carried the burden.
It is also notable that both sides backed down. The Senate subsequently voted and passed the measure 26 to 23, before its being vetoed by then-President Tyler.
I will pause here to highlight that, when this talking filibuster took place in 1841, the Senate had grown to 52 Members--twice the number that existed at the end of the first session in 1790 and just over half of the size of today's body.
It is important because it will become clear that the growing size of the Senate and the soaring workload on the institution itself very much would influence the use and the effectiveness of the filibuster.
This moves us into the so-called “Golden Age of the Senate,” the antebellum period where Clay, Calhoun, Webster, and others took to the Senate floor to debate enormously consequential bills related to tariffs, slavery, western expansion, and other major issues.
Behind me is a painting of Senator Clay addressing the Senate during debate on the Compromise of 1850. The first thing which stands out to me is the number of Senators who are in the Chamber to give close attention to his arguments.
I might note that the only two Senators in this Chamber right now are my great friend Senator Merkley of Oregon and, of course, the Presiding Officer, Senator Moreno.
But look at what the Senate was like once upon a time. I think many of my colleagues might share my jealousy. Look at how many showed up for this debate.
The second thing of note is that the Compromise of 1850 took many legislative twists and turns before finally passing and becoming law, after several months of debate on the Senate floor.
It is very hard to imagine months of debate on a major bill in today's modern Senate.
It is true that some Senators from the South took action to delay or filibuster legislation during this era. They certainly wanted the opportunity to speak their minds, to amend. But, ultimately, Senators in the minority allowed final votes to take place.
I will quote extensively from scholars to highlight where the Senate filibusters stood before the Civil War and for a few decades after.
Scholars Gregory Wawro and Eric Schickler, also cited in that CRS memo, note the minimal impact of filibustering during this time period.
They write:
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Similarly, Franklin Burdette, a historian writing in 1940, explained why filibusters were still uncommon and mostly ineffective--1940. He writes: “For the first 90 years of” the history of the Senate, they “rely for the most part upon dignity, courtesy, and custom to hold within bounds the practice of filibustering.”
There was obstruction, but, at the same time, there was usually a deep respect for the prestige of the Senate--a deference which contrasts sharply with the brazen defiance so common in subsequent years.
I would like to draw attention to this graphic beside me. It sums up this 10,000-word speech in a single image. I have titled it “From Courtesy to Calamity,” and we will keep it up here for the next several minutes as I walk through how the filibuster evolved over time and now approaches a crisis point.
Burdette and other scholars point out that filibusters started to grow in number and potency around 1880, especially as a session of Congress approached its final days. What I have experienced in the final days of a session, apparently, is not new around here. We oftentimes see an aggressive final push to get bills across the finish line.
Note where we are at here, this month and next.
Deadlines, of course, can always encourage increased activity as the clock starts to run out. But scholars report several occasions when Senators--sometimes acting alone, sometimes working with a few colleagues--were able to use long speeches toward the end of a session to prevent the Senate from passing legislation that they opposed or to secure a policy change to their liking.
Senators were especially effective when they also used repetitive motions, points of order, and quorum calls to bring the Senate to a standstill.
In fact, Senate Historian Richard Baker and journalist Neil MacNeil summarized the emergence of the filibuster in the 19th century this way:
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On the whole, however, the Senate still operated under majority rule, despite the long-winded speeches and this filibuster.
In fact, Wawro and Schickler summarized:
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By the beginning of the 20th century, the Senate had grown to 90 Members, as Montana and many other Territories now had become States.
Equally important, the workload of the Senate had increased substantially, and the Federal Government had started to expand its reach into matters previously reserved to the States.
More Members and more work empowered Senators to filibuster legislation and demand changes to remove their objections, and the majority party knew that it was becoming more difficult to exhaust an energetic minority because there simply wasn't enough time to process all the priority bills without the cooperation of every Member. While still rare, the filibuster had become an effective tool for obstruction.
Even more concerning, the courtesy and decorum that previously held the practice of filibusters within bounds started to erode.
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge spoke in 1893 of the importance of “reciprocal courtesy,” which scholar Lauren Bell summarized as a “willingness on the part of the speaker to, upon making his case, surrender the floor and permit a vote to take place on the measure under consideration.” In fact, “Lodge argued that if senators would be willing to voluntarily break from a commitment to `reciprocal courtesy,' no reforms to the Senate legislative procedures would be necessary.”
This commitment to reciprocal courtesy would instead gradually decline further.
The Senate was undergoing another change around this time. Our Nation's differences were increasingly becoming defined by partisanship versus geography. And as time would prove, increased partisanship meant this institution would no longer be as insulated from politics, putting a crucial feature of the Senate at risk. And, as time would prove, increased partisanship meant this institution would no longer be insulated from politics.
In fact, in 1872, Senators overturned the guidance from Jefferson's manual and previous rulings that floor speeches had to be relevant to the bill under debate. Senators could now talk about whatever they wanted to, which made it easier to filibuster.
George Haynes would later argue that reestablishing a germaneness rule, as well as enforcing the two-speech rule, would dramatically reduce the effectiveness of the talking filibuster.
Efforts to reverse the 1872 ruling continued well into the 20th century without success. In addition, Senators tried a number of times to change the rules to allow a simple majority to end debate.
The effort did secure majority support in 1890 but was obstructed as part of the broader filibuster on the Force Bill.
Other attempts also failed, demonstrating a consistent reluctance among Senators to deny a Senator the courtesy of debate. And Senators in the majority knew that they could not move to other important bills until they found a resolution to filibustering Senators.
Senators in the majority didn't always tolerate filibusters, however. In fact, they took numerous actions in the back half of the 19th century to help the majority overcome filibustering tactics.
In 2011, CRS provided the Senate Rules Committee with an exhaustive list of efforts to limit debate. Similarly, our former colleague Paul Fannin of Arizona did the same thing on the Senate floor back in 1969.
I won't go through each action, but here are some reforms that took place: During the Civil War, the Senate limited debate when they were in secret session. In 1868, the Senate adopted a rule establishing that the motion to proceed shall be determined without debate. In 1872, the Senate adopted a standing order prohibiting filibusters on appropriations amendments for the rest of the session. In 1880, the Senate adopted the so-called Anthony rule to limit debate on noncontroversial bills. And in 1897, the Senate adopted a precedent that quorum calls could not be ordered unless actual business, rather than mere speaking, had taken place since the previous quorum call.
Wawro and Schickler similarly pointed to actions the Senate took in the 19th century to curb obstruction and empower majority rule. As noted by the 2016 CRS memo, they go a step further by arguing that the mere threat of changing rules of precedence “were a significant restraint on obstruction.”
They reiterated:
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But the patience with the filibuster ultimately wore out. A filibuster against the Ship Purchase Act, in 1915, grounded the Senate to a halt for weeks, successfully killing the bill. Even a continuous session lasting 54 hours could not overcome the minority.
And when 11 Senators locked arms in 1917 to filibuster and defeat legislation to authorize the provision of arms to U.S. merchant ships under threat from German submarines, the Senate had said: That is enough.
It may come as a surprise to new Members and the American people that the first supermajority cloture rule adopted in 1917 was meant to help the institution overcome such crippling talking filibusters, not become synonymous with the term “filibuster” itself. It provided a way to shut off debate with the support of two-thirds of voting Senators.
We can learn a clear lesson from the development of the cloture mechanism and by the prior efforts, sometimes successfully, to limit debate and overcome filibusters. And that is, when obstruction is used to kill a bill rather than improve it, Senators in the majority oftentimes get fed up and contemplate decisive action to stop the obstruction.
While I believe majorities should exercise restraint in those scenarios, I also believe filibustering Senators should do the same and focus on enhancing deliberation, not blatant obstruction. And Senators mostly did so for several decades after this cloture tool was established. Cloture was rarely used, and the culture of allowing Senators to speak and amend continued. Senators were still reluctant to shut down their colleagues too soon, and Senators in the minority were still selective in obstructing measures and infuriating a clear majority of Senators.
In 1959, political scientist Donald Matthews wrote a highly regarded article on the folkways of the Senate and made an interesting observation on why the filibuster was still rare then.
He wrote:
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Senators who want to accomplish their own policy goals need the cooperation of everybody else, and the same goes for the rest of the body. This, Matthews found, resulted in Senators trading votes and extending courtesy to each other, helping to reduce their willingness to obstruct and filibuster each other.
In a deeply unfortunate irony, when Senators did use the talking filibuster in the decades after cloture became a tool, it was largely to block civil rights legislation. In fact, according to Binder and Smith, the filibuster, which was often described as protecting minority rights, was used 15 times to prolong discrimination against Black Americans.
This takes us back to Senator Mansfield of Montana's efforts to halt the use of the filibuster.
By the late 1960s, Senators of both parties had become frustrated with the filibuster and embarked on a multiyear effort to change the rules. At one point, the Senate came very close to establishing a simple-majority cloture process through what is commonly known and called the constitutional option in which the Senate can adopt rules changes at the beginning of a session with only majority support required. Leader Mike Mansfield was ultimately successful in forging a compromise to lower the cloture threshold from 67 to 60 Senators.
Further, the Senate adopted the practice of dual-tracking, which allows the Senate to process legislation even while another bill is being filibustered. Senators who want to filibuster a bill would no longer need to hold the floor or do any work, for that matter. It was a trade that opened up floor time for other matters but made filibustering extremely easy. The Senate has never been the same since the modern, no-effort filibuster became the norm.
In 1997, political scientists Catherine Fisk and Erwin Chemerinsky wrote:
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In fact, in 2010, CRS expert Stanley Bach pointed out that filibusters went from “unusual happenings” in the 1960s to “almost a routine part of the Senate's floor procedures.”
In the Senate today, filibusters and cloture motions have become almost trivialized. As this graph shows, from 1917 to 1974, cloture was filed 126 times. But between 1975 and 2024, cloture was filed 2,762 times. The use of the no-effort filibuster and preemptive cloture petitions has exploded.
Bach was testifying during a series of hearings that the Senate Rules Committee held in 2010 to analyze the Framers' design for the Senate, how the filibuster became what it is today and how Senators could work in a bipartisan way to make this body work better.
Senator Byrd, a lion of this institution, submitted two prepared statements and testified in person at the May 2010 hearing, just weeks before his death. While voicing opposition to simple-majority cloture, he lamented the modern practice of the filibuster.
Byrd said:
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Byrd added that “a true filibuster is a fight, not a threat or a bluff.” He highlighted that filibusters previously were grueling and exhausting, but “now, unbelievably, just the whisper of opposition brings the `world's greatest deliberative body' to a grinding halt.”
The efforts between 2010 and 2013 brought about reforms to reduce the number of nominations that require Senate confirmation, change the secret hold process, and encourage more amendments and fewer cloture votes. The first two reforms were largely successful; the last two were not.
In 2013, the Senate adopted a rule--paragraph 3 of rule XXII--that streamlines cloture on the motion to proceed if the cloture petition is signed by eight Republicans and eight Democrats, including the majority and minority leader. But 13 years later, it hasn't been used a single time.
Further, the majority and minority leaders announced a handshake agreement committing to increased cooperation, fewer procedural delays, and more amendment votes. It, too, proved unsuccessful.
The Senate adopted a special order for that session where the majority leader had the option to bring measures to the floor under a process that would guarantee an equal number of amendment votes from Democrats and Republicans. Not surprisingly, this tool likewise was never used.
By November 2013, just months after the Senate adopted these reforms to encourage cooperation, we saw the Senate use the nuclear option to exempt most executive and judicial nominees, except for Supreme Court Justices, from the supermajority cloture requirement. The reforms made in early 2013 proved too weak and ineffective.
The cascade of majoritarian exceptions established through the nuclear option has only continued since. And while the current Republican majority never came close to using the nuclear option to end the legislative filibuster, it seems inevitable that one party or the other will do so in the future absent a major cultural change in the U.S. Senate. We are on a trajectory toward calamity.
Madam President, I can understand why many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle are frustrated with what the Senate has become. Can any of us argue that today's silent filibuster and trivialized demand for cloture bear any resemblance to the minor delay tactic used in 1789 or to the principle of reciprocal courtesy or to even how the Senate operated 60 years ago when reciprocity and restraint were still the norm?
I thought it was critical to walk through the history of the filibuster to establish a foundation for much needed reforms. We need a firm foundation to make wise decisions. But for me, this is not merely an academic or aspirational exercise; we must also be deeply pragmatic and recognize the realities of the modern U.S. Senate and the hyperpartisanship that saturates our political discourse. Therefore, to insist on an unattainable goal or ideal of a bygone era would be unwise, but to hold out hope for institutional self-correction is irresponsible.
I believe the most responsible course--our last, best hope to save this institution--is to realign the Senate by rewarding bipartisan deliberation and bringing the Senate back to its original practices.
So with that as the North Star, I now want to walk through my proposal with Senator Merkley, a Democrat from Oregon, who worked with me, a Republican from Montana.
As most in this Chamber know, Senator Merkley has been a longtime and consistent voice for restoring the Senate to its original design and practice--especially the talking filibuster. He literally cowrote a book on it. So it was an easy decision to reach out to him this summer after I put together some initial thoughts on my own. We finalized our joint plan in October. We were working on this for many months.
I just want to note that when Senator Merkley and I put this plan together, it was before the November election.
It contains four key proposals.
The first is to reduce dead time on the Senate floor by scaling back the number of cloture petitions and intervening days that needlessly waste time that could be used for amendment votes and substantive debates. Our fundamental belief is that the Senate should be voting and debating far more often than being in a quorum call.
We propose eliminating cloture on the motion to proceed and the intervening day that currently comes with it. This is a proposal that Senator Byrd and many others have suggested for years. And as previously noted, the motion to proceed has not always been subject to debate. The Senate should exempt it from cloture again.
We propose codifying in Senate rules the debate time limits this body has already established for nominations through the nuclear option--30 hours of debate time for Supreme Court and Cabinet-level nominations and 2 hours for every else.
We propose eliminating cloture on amendments with 1 hour of debate equally divided so there is actual voting as opposed to seemingly endless delays while waiting for a time agreement to come together.
Our second proposal is to establish a suspension process to allow bipartisan bills to pass the Senate at a two-thirds threshold once they have cleared committee. This tool is designed for bills that are robustly bipartisan and are noncontroversial or minimally opposed. This, too, is long overdue.
Right now, in practice in the Senate, there are three ways to pass a bill:
First, go through rule XXII, the cloture process, which can take up to 2 weeks of floor time.
Second, a bill can clear the hotline on both sides and pass by voice vote, meaning the bill must gain the support--or at least not the active opposition--of every single Senator.
Third, Senators can try to add legislation to another bill that is on the floor, sometimes on must-pass bills at the end of a year or a session. It sounds very familiar as we are looking at wrapping up this Congress at the end of the year. We sometimes call these Christmas tree ornaments. In my experience, the negotiation to add bills to a larger package is done in good faith, but it is very much behind the scenes and in the dark. It is the closest thing to a cigar smoke-filled room you can come to in Washington, DC--perhaps without the smoke.
I have had success in passing legislation using each of these methods, and under my proposal with Senator Merkley, all three would remain as options. These reforms would create new tools for Senators seeking to advance legislation, not replace existing ones.
But earlier this year, I asked CRS to look back at the last four sessions of Congress and determine how many bipartisan bills that had cleared a Senate committee simply died at the end of the session because they didn't get their own individual floor time, didn't get support from 100 out of 100 even if robustly supported, and came up short in the effort to be added to a must-pass bill.
CRS reported back. Since 1917--excuse me--since 2017--this is looking back at the last 8 years--665 bipartisan bills that cleared committee subsequently died.
Let me say that again: 665 bipartisan bills clearing committees died, never saw the light of day here in this Chamber.
The work of gaining bipartisan cosponsors, receiving a legislative hearing, securing bipartisan passage, witnesses traveling in for hearings, having markups ultimately went for nothing.
I know this isn't a perfect metric. There could be other reasons why the Senate's dysfunction--there could be other reasons beyond the Senate's dysfunction that some of the bills became stuck in the mud. But the reality is, hundreds of bipartisan committee-passed bills had no place to go should motivate this body to find an alternative way to allow these bills to at least get a vote.
Under our proposal, the chairman and ranking member--it is a bipartisan combination--could motion to bring committee-passed bipartisan bills to the floor under suspension. They could bundle bills together and meet the eligibility of bipartisanship.
Members would have the right to motion to strike a bill or provision they oppose, but otherwise the proposal or set of proposals would go straight to a vote on passage without amendment after a specified number of hours of debate. And if they gained the support of 67 more Senators, it would pass.
This proposal, while having the potential to become enormously useful, is not a new concept in the Senate. In fact, under the current rule X, two-thirds of Senators can determine the next subject for consideration on the Senate floor. And if there are at least 67 Senators to orchestrate a motion to bring a bill to the floor, it could be reasonably concluded that there are probably at least 67 Senators who would support its passage.
I am told that rule X hasn't been used since the 1940s. The process for considering the bill, once it comes to the floor, is ill-defined and, frankly, unclear. But the concept of bringing legislation to the floor and passing it at a two-thirds threshold already exists in today's Senate rules.
Meanwhile, rule V of the Senate prescribes the process for suspending other rules. Interestingly enough, before 1915, the Senate could suspend rules, pass legislation with a simple majority threshold, and the body did so at least 13 times before the rule was changed in 1915 to require a two-thirds threshold.
Our proposal would establish a straightforward process to pass bipartisan bills with the support of at least two-thirds of the Senators.
The third and fourth proposals overlap considerably and represent the boldest colors of our plan. We propose establishing a new mechanism to both process and pass bipartisan bills at simple majority thresholds. This tool could be used for authorizing appropriations bills.
This is another derivative of the Prevent Government Shutdowns Act. Our intent is to address the double whammy of the current practice of the cloture rule.
Rule XXII erects a supermajority barrier that even bipartisan bills with majority support sometimes can't clear. On the other hand, it is readily used to stifle the right to amend once 60 votes are locked down and debate is shut off.
Here is how our plan would work: The chairman and ranking member of the committee of jurisdiction could give notice of intent to bring legislation to the floor after it has passed committee with strong bipartisan support. The notice would provide every Member of the Senate--on and off committee--with the opportunity to file amendments. The chair and the ranking member would be required to identify at least eight amendments for authorizing bills, 20 minutes for appropriations bills, equally divided, by Republican- and Democrat-led amendments. That is right. Believe it or not, our plan restores the Senate's right to amend.
For most of my 12 years in the Senate, the right to amend has been a caricature of what it has been in generations past. In an unfortunate irony, deliberation in the era of cloture and pain-free filibustering is but a fragment of what it once was, and substantive floor amendments are but crumbs. Too often, the Senate is a body in the midst of a quorum call, not deliberation.
More often than not, Senators have had very few opportunities to amend. Sure, there are times where noncontroversial amendments can be added to a managers' package or substitute amendment, and there are times when some amendments, including so-called poison pills, get votes in exchange for reducing postcloture debate but only if the amendment is certain to fail.
Our proposal seeks to restore the opportunity for votes for a third bucket of amendments. Those that are bipartisan would make substantive changes to legislation that its sponsors or managers might prefer to exclude but that are germane to the bill and, in fact, might even pass if they get a vote.
These amendments should not be suppressed, especially if they are bipartisan. And if they create a policy conflict that must be resolved in the House in a formal or informal conference down the road, I say that is OK. That is how the regular order of deliberations worked in the past and should work again.
Under our plan, amendments would be listed in the motion that brings the measure to the floor. The motion requires 16 signers--16 signers-- similar to rule XXII's cloture process, but to gain fast-track consideration on the Senate floor, it must be signed by the chairman and ranking member, plus at least three other Republican and Democratic Members--both sides--who do not sit on the committee of jurisdiction.
The legislation would come to the floor with 15 additional calendar days, provided the motion is signed by the requisite composition of Senators.
Amendment votes would be guaranteed including for off-committee Members. The amendment tree could not be filled. Regular order would be restored.
Members would debate the underlying bill and amendments and vote on the amendments within the prescribed number of hours. Typically, authorizing bills could be amended and voted on within one calendar day after they hit the floor. Appropriations bills could pass within two calendar days.
And, finally, the proposals allow the chairman and ranking member to bundle bipartisan committee-passed bills. Up to three appropriations bills could be combined and considered on the floor without the need for unanimous consent.
The budget and appropriations process is one of my greatest frustrations. Here is a staggering and stunning fact that most Members are aware of but--I am guessing--maybe most folks back home aren't aware of: The Senate and the House have not enacted all 12 appropriations bills by September 30, the end of the fiscal year, since 1996; 30 years--30 years--of continuing resolutions, minibuses, omnibuses.
In theory, the Senate should have considered 144 appropriations bills over my 12 years in this institution. But on 58 occasions, bipartisan appropriations bills that cleared committee, sometimes with votes of 27 to 0, never came before the full Senate for consideration. For various reasons, they became stuck.
My proposals with Senator Merkley would make both omnibuses and government shutdowns much less likely. They would empower every Senator with the right to amend these bills on the Senate floor. And if utilized regularly, they could help stop the trend of the majority party going outside of the appropriations process to fund contentious programs or policies.
I mentioned a minute ago that our proposal allows bipartisan bills to be both processed and passed with simple majority support. We create what is often called a majoritarian exception.
While it is true that the filibuster typically requires supermajority support to pass legislation, it is also true that majoritarian exceptions in the Senate are quite common.
According to Senate scholar Molly Reynolds, there are at least 161 majoritarian exceptions in law. To put this more clearly, on at least 161 occasions, the U.S. Senate has voted to prohibit filibusters on specified topics to allow related legislation to pass with simple majority support. We saw this as recently as 2021 when the Senate voted to create an exception to the filibuster to allow a subsequent bill of raising the debt limit to pass with only majority support.
We see majoritarian exceptions come to the Senate floor on a regular basis: reconciliation; War Powers Resolutions; Congressional Review Act resolutions; budget rescissions; canceling weapons sales; free-trade agreements established under trade promotion authority. Some, such as the Base Realignment and Closure--or BRAC, as it is called--are not used very often but still very much exist.
And you will notice that in the modern Senate, most of these fast-tracked or privileged majoritarian exceptions are used for overwhelmingly partisan initiatives. Sometimes the party who holds the trifecta of the White House, the Senate, and the House use them to enact sweeping reforms, and other times the minority party seeks them to use them to rein in Presidential actions. But the point is the same: They are primarily used for party-line initiatives.
My proposal with Senator Merkley encourages exactly the opposite. It establishes the majoritarian exception in Senate rules but only for bipartisan bills. It incentivizes and rewards bipartisan policymaking, empowers committees to go forth and conquer, and brings the Senate back to its original design and practice, and that is debate, amend, vote.
We are hopeful that these reforms will help lower the temperature of the Senate.
And for those of us who think it would be damaging for the Senate to use the nuclear option to pass even more party-line legislation, I would respectfully suggest that adopting these reforms and using them would reduce the likelihood that either party would take that unwanted action.
To summarize, our plan reduces unnecessary procedural delays, establishes a modern tool to pass less controversial bills under suspension, and creates a separate fast-track tool, a simple majority, 51-vote threshold for bipartisan bills, one that provides every Member the opportunity to amend.
I would like to respond to some common concerns about substantial changes to Senate rules. The first and most prominent is the concern that the Senate will become just like the House.
Well, to say the obvious, our proposal doesn't touch any of the Senate's distinguishing features contained in the Constitution I highlighted earlier. States will continue to have equal representation. Our terms will continue to be 6 years. And, of course, the 17th Amendment provided for direct elections more than a century ago for Senators.
So it seems skepticism should be given to any claim the U.S. Senate will become irreparably broken by discouraging the modern practice of the filibuster, considering the Framers did not envision it or suggest it was imperative for the function of this body.
But I know exactly what concern Senators are getting at. The unfortunate reality is that, in practice, the Senate is not immune from political pressure. Far too often, we are not the “temperate and responsible body of citizens” that exists “to suspend the blow mediated by the people”--that is the House of Representatives-- “against themselves until reason, justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind,” as James Madison so masterfully described the Senate in Federalist 63.
While our 6-year terms remain intact, majority control of the Senate is up for grabs every 2 years. Politics weigh heavily on decision making in the Senate, just as they do in the House. As an institution, the Senate is no longer nearly as politically insulated as our Founding Fathers had hoped.
I saw this firsthand when I was the NRSC Chairman in 2024. I helped lead the effort to restore a Republican majority, and 2 years later, the Democrats took it right back. I must say that wasn't exactly the parting gift I had hoped for from my colleagues across the aisle.
If this were merely an academic exercise, I would suggest that what is broken in the Senate is not the concept that a majority of States should still be able to pass a bill but, instead, that the deliberative judgment the Framers envisioned for the Senate has deteriorated.
But as I said earlier, this isn't an academic exercise. We must be clear-eyed about the dangers of the politicly charged time we live in.
And for that reason, I think there is merit to the concern that returning an outright majority rule in the Senate, especially if done with the nuclear option, would do major and lasting harm to this institution. Worse, it could further divide our citizens and create dangerous instability across our country.
Our plan seeks a healthy balance. It encourages the Senate to pass legislation at majority rule wherever bipartisan consensus exists while retaining the cloture process for strictly partisan bills. It is even possible that bills would be processed and passed with fewer than 60 votes but only if the bills are bipartisan.
In short, our plan encourages Senators to run to our common ground, rather than their own corners.
I believe that this transformation is urgently needed and would be extremely helpful to this institution. I can tell you, it would boost morale of Senators in power committees once again.
A second possible objection is a fundamental belief the Senate does not need to change its rules; it only needs to change its behavior. As a literal matter, this might be true, but color me skeptical of that idea.
If the minority rarely filibustered and requiring cloture was the exception not the rule, if the majority regularly allows the substantive amendments to get votes regardless of the outcome, we could theoretically debate and have up-or-down votes on more legislation without change to the rules.
But let's be honest. It is extremely unlikely that a sufficient number of Senators in the majority and the minority will come together and, through a change of behavior alone, restore regular order and halt the Senate's institutional decline.
No, I am persuaded by my now nearly 12 years in the Senate that our rules and practices have contributed to the deteriorating culture of this body. They are far from the cause and are arguably more of a symptom of the broader political dynamics rather than a cause. But they do make it too easy to obstruct and too hard for good-faith bipartisan work to get to the Senate floor.
I mentioned that most of the reforms adopted in 2013 did not work, and I recognize it is possible that my plan with Senator Merkley might also prove inadequate in achieving its goals. I also agree with what Burdette said in his 1940 book on filibustering. He wrote:
The solution, whatever it is, will never be found to lie wholly in a set of rules. It must rely, in part, on the election of legislators with a keen sense of public responsibility--men, [women], who will never allow political strife to thwart a need for action.
So, yes, the solution does rely in part on behavior. It cannot be solved by rules alone. But I believe changing the rules are absolutely essential. They can influence behavior. They can incentivize true deliberation and foster bipartisan policymaking. They can empower the rules. They must be strong, and above all, they must be used once adopted.
This again is the balance that Senator Merkley and I have sought to strike.
Another potential objection to our proposed fast-track tools is the assertion that the Senate was not made to move quickly. Here again, I generally agree. As discussed at length, the Framers established the Senate to guard against and defeat improper legislation that the House has perhaps passed in haste.
But under our plan for bipartisan measures, we insist on full committee review before a bill can come to the floor. Committees would seek input from Members on the front end of creating legislation, hold legislative hearings, then hold a markup where on-committee Members could seek improvements, and then the committee would seek and need to pass the bill with strong bipartisan support before it can be eligible for fast-track procedures on the Senate floor.
Bills that come to the floor on a rule XIV, which waives committee consideration, would be ineligible for these fast-track procedures.
So I think our plan ensures meaningful deliberation both at the committee level and on the floor. Every Member would have a chance to modify or vote to defeat a bill.
So in summary, while the Senate was not designed to act in haste, it was designed to function. And our plan will improve the workflow of the Senate while also restoring deliberation.
The final potential concern that I will address today is that bipartisan initiatives, however noble in motivation and design, should not be encouraged over party-line bills on the same topic that contain better policies.
I must say that I am somewhat sympathetic to this concern. After all, the Framers designed the Senate to ensure the support from both large and small populated states is needed to pass a bill, not support from a mix of Federalists and anti-Federalists, or in today's context, Republicans and Democrats. But here again, I think it would be misguided to ignore the realities of today's political climate. There is typically a clear party-line divide on high-profile contentious issues. We should be careful to avoid seeing the Senate pass major reforms on a partisan basis which then can shift sharply in a different direction a few years later.
At the same time, Members across the aisle are drawn to work together on many other issues because they fundamentally share a concern about the status quo and agree on how to address it.
In fact, every committee I have served on as Senator has produced bipartisan proposals on weighty issues, and nearly half of my own bills have had bipartisan cosponsorships. I am not just talking about naming post offices. I am talking about tax, healthcare, energy, environment, commerce, banking, and foreign affairs. The list goes on. I have seen Republicans and Democrats create a stronger product through their partnership and the exchange of ideas.
My proposal with Senator Merkley rewards such bipartisan work. It will help bring the best out of the Senate without forcing Senators to compromise their values and principles. It is a set of proposals that will encourage bipartisanship in both unified government, when partisan policymaking is most tempting, as well as in divided government.
We, of course, will be a divided government for at least the next 2 years, and Senator Merkley and I are convinced these reforms could help the Senate function better and will lead in solving our Nation's pressing challenges for the good of the American people.
Bipartisan policymaking will not just be preferable; it will be mandatory if you want to get something done here.
I offer no conjecture on whether Senator Mansfield or Senator Byrd or Senator Hatch would support each of these bipartisan proposals that Senator Merkley and I have put forward, though I think it is quite plausible they would.
But based on their clear misgivings about the pervasive abuse of the filibuster, I am near certain that they would recognize the Senate has increasingly diminished and that the previous reforms have failed to restore this institution as a deliberative body rather than simply an obstructionist body. And I am near certain that they would want Members who are now privileged to hold this office to do everything in their power in a bipartisan way to get the Senate working again for the American people. And that is what Senator Merkley and I are seeking to do with these bold yet reasonable proposals.
I urge my colleagues to closely review these proposals. I look forward to continuing conversation with them over the next month. And for the good of this great country, I hope all Senators--Republicans and Democrats, Independents alike--can come together to save the Senate, halt its decline, restore its prestige and its effectiveness.
Change is once again in the air, and now is the time to act.
I yield the floor.
Original page in the Congressional Record (172 Cong. Rec. S5729)